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THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON NEUROMARKETING: REFLECTIONS ON A DECADE 
OF RESEARCH  
 
In 2007, two of this present author team published one of the first academic papers to 
mention the term ‘neuromarketing’ (Lee, Broderick, and Chamberlain, 2007). Whether that 
paper, or the one of Fugate (2007), was actually the first to use the term in a published 
scholarly article (although Smidts did use the term in his 2002 address to the Erasmus 
Institute of Management) is less important than the clear conclusion that we are now around a 
decade on from the earliest attempts to provide some kind of coalescing of the various 
diverse strands of then-existing work, into what could pass as an embryonic ‘field of 
research’. Before then, marketing-relevant work had appeared across various different 
disciplinary boundaries, sometimes in marketing journals (e.g. Ambler et al., 2004), 
sometimes in economics or decision science (e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005), 
and sometimes in neuroscience itself (Braeutigam et al., 2001).  
 
Since 2007 however, the last decade has seen, if not quite an explosion, then certainly a 
major upsurge in neuromarketing research in the marketing literature. From a point in 2007 
where Lee, Broderick, and Chamberlain felt able to point out a “lack of take-up of brain 
imaging methodologies in marketing science” (p. 199), we are now in a situation where a 
special issue of one of our discipline’s top research journals has been dedicated to 
neuromarketing (Camerer and Yoon, 2015), and it is no longer unusual to see individual 
studies appearing in the marketing literature that use neuroscientific methods. Conference 
sessions are regularly held to discuss neuromarketing issues (e.g. Reimann, Hedgcock, and 
Craig, 2016), and agendas for work in the area appear on a non-infrequent basis (e.g. Hubert 
and Kenning, 2008; Reimann et al., 2011; Smidts et al, 2014; Solnais et al., 2012). Indeed, 
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neuromarketing, and its associated term ‘consumer neuroscience’ (e.g. Javor et al., 2013; 
Kenning and Linzmajer, 2011; Plassmann, et al., 2015), have become increasingly popular 
topics of both empirical research, and conceptual theorizing. It seems opportune at this point 
then, to step back and take some stock of whether or not the promise identified in early 
neuromarketing papers has been fulfilled.  
 
In this commentary, we reflect on the last decade of research in what we loosely define as the 
neuromarketing field. In particular, we present a basic schematic framework, that allows us to 
unpack a number of areas which we see as somewhat problematic. While they are not all 
unique to marketing, and for the most part have been covered in other fields of study 
(including neuroscience itself) it strikes us that the inherent subject matter of marketing 
research may make neuromarketing a field that is particularly susceptible to these problems. 
While we are unable to provide total solutions to these issues, we are able to point the reader 
towards potential directions in which such problems can be more coherently addressed, and 
advances in neuroscientific research that may help solve them.  
 
Neuromarketing Research: An Illustrative Framework 
Figure 1 presents what could be considered an illustration of the typical empirical 
neuromarketing study. At this point, it is important that we will use the term 
‘neuromarketing’ to refer to research using methodologies drawn from cognitive 
neuroscience, that attempt in some way to measure brain activity. That is, techniques such as 
electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), positron emission 
tomography (PET), and by far the most popular in this field, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). We also would consider techniques such genetic studies, skin conductance 
response, and the like to be within the field of neuromarketing. We recognize that this is a 
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reasonably informal definition, but it does tend to chime with similar work in management 
and organizational research (e.g. Senior, Lee, and Butler, 2011).  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Figure 1 visualizes the basic process of a typical neuromarketing study, although of course 
we do recognize that there will be variance here, and also that some studies may 
operationalize a subset of these tasks and links. However, we feel this diagram presents a 
useful starting point from which to discuss the various key issues germane to neuromarketing 
research. Specifically, we consider that there are three critical points of interest here, which 
have not received enough discussion in neuromarketing-relevant literature. Taken together, 
they have substantive implications for the development of a more reflective neuromarketing, 
which in turn has greater potential to make a positive impact on marketing knowledge, 
marketing practice, and public perceptions of marketing activity in general. All three issues 
will be discussed in depth below, beginning with the dominant event-related reactive (i.e. 
stimulus-response) design of typical neuromarketing work. Following this, we will discuss 
the ability of the methods typically used in neuromarketing research to actually measure brain 
activity. Subsequently, we address important issues concerning inference. In other words, 
even if we measure brain activity in response to some stimulus, what does this actually tell 
us? This latter issue has received some attention in marketing-relevant studies, but we believe 
a significant proportion of neuromarketing work has fallen prey to some key errors of 
inference, which bears greater discussion. Following this, we will address why marketing 
research is in a particularly dangers position with regards to these issues, and present some 
recommendations for future neuromarketing work, to maximise its potential contribution. 
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On the Dominance of Event-Based Designs in Neuromarketing 
The typical study design used in neuromarketing could be called event-based, or perhaps 
stimulus-based. Such a design is essentially what most researchers consider as the traditional 
controlled-experimental design. That is, subjects are exposed to some (hopefully) well-
designed experimental stimulus, and their brain activity is measured, usually along with some 
behavioral response (e.g. a choice). Further, some other physiological and / or psychological 
variables may be measured (perhaps as controls), and the variables utilized in a regression-
based analysis framework. Such approaches are dominant in cognitive neuroscience in 
general, and also in neuromarketing. Indeed, an informal review of neuromarketing research 
could find no empirical work that significantly differed from these fundamental principles.  
 
This event-based design implies a view of the brain as a reactive system, where the brain 
receives sensory inputs, which cause some neural activity, which in turn cause some 
behavioral or cognitive / affective response of interest (Raichle and Snyder, 2007). While the 
approach has been the foundational workhorse of all cognitive neuroscience, it is also not 
without significant limitations. In particular, it has been observed that responses to the same 
stimulus are highly variable across multiple trials, even in so basic a setting as the 
measurement of response times (Braeutigam, Lee, and Senior, 2017). Such variations may be 
due to the endogenous activity that is present at all times within the human brain. 
Specifically, it is the case that the brain is never inactive, simply waiting for some stimulus to 
respond to. While most people readily understand that brain activity is necessary for basic 
homeostasis (i.e. the activity necessary for us to stay alive), fewer are aware that the brain’s 
spontaneous activity is far more complex and significant. For example, in recent years, it has 
become well accepted that this intrinsic brain activity is not simply random noise, or due to 
mental tasks (like daydreaming for example). Rather, the resting activity of the brain also 
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occurs completely spontaneously, and can be described by specific patterns of coherence, 
observable across many different brain regions, beyond those necessary to maintain life 
(Braeutigam, Lee, and Senior, 2017). Importantly, it seems that the brain’s resting activity 
actually requires almost the same amount of energy as even very demanding task-related 
activity (Raichle and Mintun, 2006), implying that task-focused activity is simply a 
temporary redistribution of energy. That resting activity consumes such a huge proportion of 
the body’s metabolic rate (around 20%) implies that in and of itself, it plays some crucial role 
in human life.  
 
In more recent years, various researchers have investigated intrinsic (also known as 
endogenous, or spontaneous) brain activity. For example, much attention has been focused on 
what is known as the default mode network, which has been suggested to be somehow 
implicated in self-awareness and social cognition (e.g. Schilbach et al., 2008). Further, an 
emerging consensus is that endogenous brain activity plays some role in the variability across 
identical trials within the same subject (Mennes et al, 2010). In other words, it seems likely 
that endogenous brain activity somehow interacts with stimulus-driven activity, in a complex 
non-linear way (Huang et al., 2015). In particular, Braeutigam, Lee, and Senior (2017) report 
the growing evidence that endogenous brain activity somehow influences perception, 
memory, motor control, and decision making. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes 
here, Braeutigam (2007) showed that endogenous brain activity differences were associated 
with differences in choice-making within a retail product choice context. In other words, the 
ongoing activity of the brain could be used to predict a subject’s choice of product before the 
subject even saw the choice option stimuli.  
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If endogenous brain activity is somehow implicated in our responses to stimuli, it seems that 
existing neuromarketing research is only able to give us part of the explanation for how we 
make choices or respond to marketing stimuli. Importantly, it is impossible to capture such 
influences using the traditional event-based experimental designs. What is needed are pre-
stimulus designs, where brain activity is measured prior to subject exposure to the 
experimental stimuli. Braeutigam, Lee, and Senior (2017) provide an introduction to this field 
of work, as well as the complex mathematics involved in capturing endogenous brain activity 
in a useful way. However, beyond this, it may be necessary to move beyond the dominance 
of fMRI methods if we wish to provide more insight into endogenous brain activity. 
Specifically, as will be seen below, fMRI has poor ability to resolve temporal information, 
which is crucial in such pre-stimulus designs. Indeed, most significant research in this area 
uses techniques such as EEG and MEG, which have much better temporal resolution.  
 
Beyond fMRI: The Potential of Alternative Modalities in Neuromarketing 
As already mentioned, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) dominates 
neuromarketing research, although EEG is also a popular method. The picture is similar in 
cognitive neuroscience itself, where fMRI is by far the most dominant modality in empirical 
research. This dominance is such that it appears some critical observers of management and 
business research are under the impression that fMRI-based research is neuroscience (e.g. 
Lindebaum, 2016). Figure 2 however shows that there are a number of other techniques 
which could be employed to investigate neuromarketing questions. Figure 2 focuses on the 
variety of techniques which we argue below are most useful to neuromarketing research, and 
while we include a number of other techniques for reasons of exposition, it is important to 
recognise that the toolkit of neuroscience itself is broader than shown in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The first and possibly most important thing to note here is that fMRI does not in fact – 
contrary to popular believe – measure brain activity itself. Rather, fMRI (as employed in 
neuromarketing) measures what is known as the BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependent) 
response (although other contrasts are possible). In essence, this relies on the idea that 
increased brain activity in a given region results in increased blood flow to the active area. 
However, it should be noted that this response is not actually the brain activity itself, but in 
essence a proxy. It is important to understand that there are various limitations and caveats to 
the interpretation of the BOLD response as a proxy measure of brain activity. While most are 
beyond the scope of this commentary (we refer interested readers in particular to Logothetis, 
2008 and Heeger and Ress, 2002), we focus here on issues concerning spatial and temporal 
resolution (as presented in Figure 2). Specifically, fMRI is generally considered to have a 
strength in terms of spatial resolution, in that it can accurately resolve location (dependent on 
the accuracy of the BOLD contrast as a proxy for actual neuronal activity). However, the 
BOLD response has comparatively poor temporal resolution, lagging actual activity in the 
order of seconds. This implies that fMRI is unsuitable to examine very quick or transient 
processes, and most useful to explore processes lasting a few seconds or more. In particular, 
research projects involving dynamic processes (e.g. watching TV advertisements) do require 
significant attention paid to their design, otherwise the results are broadly meaningless due to 
this issue. Another significant issue with fMRI is the growing concern regarding the 
statistical analysis of fMRI data, based both on the necessarily huge number of statistical 
comparisons involved (e.g. Vul et al., 2009), and potential issues with common software 
(Eklund et al., 2016). Concerns regarding sample size of fMRI studies are also of note (e.g. 
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Button et al., 2013), although Butler, Lee, and Senior (2017) show that the issues are more 
complex than are commonly understood.  
 
Given the dominance of fMRI in mainstream cognitive neuroscience, it is understandable that 
it also assumes a dominant position in neuromarketing research. However, the issues pointed 
out above suggest that other modalities also have much to offer, particularly when cost-
effectiveness is taken into account. Unfortunately, apart from EEG (e.g. Boksem and Smidts, 
2015; Pozharliev et al., 2015), neuromarketing studies since 2007 appear to have largely 
ignored the potential for insight from alternative methods. However, the superior temporal 
resolution of techniques such as MEG (along with EEG) mean they have much to offer 
neuromarketing, particularly as the complexities of the decision process itself become more 
and more apparent. Prior to 2007, a few studies did employ MEG to investigate consumer 
choice contexts (e.g. Ambler et al., 2004; Braeutigam et al., 2001), but it appears these 
studies were the result of a serendipitous collaboration, and did not inspire the long-term take 
up of MEG in neuromarketing, That said, Braeutigam, Senior, and Lee’s (2017) 
aforementioned introduction of endogenous brain activity into organizational research may 
have a galvanising effect on neuromarketing researchers regarding the use of MEG and EEG. 
Another method worth some attention is Steady State Topography (SST). This method was 
pioneered by Silberstein and colleagues (1990), and combines EEG with special goggles. A 
number of studies have employed SST in advertising research (Rossiter et al., 2001; 
Silberstein and Nield, 2008). One wonders however whether the fact that SST is a proprietary 
technology has led to its lack of take-up in academic research. 
 
We certainly believe that greater attention to the use of MEG (and EEG) would provide a 
useful contribution to neuromarketing. However, again, it is important that researchers 
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understand that these techniques also have limitations, most obviously the difficulties in 
localizing the source of the electromagnetic signal within the brain. Furthermore, like fMRI, 
neither EEG nor MEG actually measures brain activity, but rather the secondary potentials 
arising from it (again making it a proxy), and also requires a reasonably large amount of 
synchronous neuronal activity to occur, in order to produce an electromagnetic signal large 
enough to be detected. Finally, while EEG is cost-effective and commonplace, MEG is more 
expensive and complex than fMRI. 
 
Electrodermal Activity (EDA) has also seen some use in neuromarketing (e.g. Gakhal and 
Senior, 2008). While it is generally well understood that EDA is not a measure of brain 
activity, it is a well-validated measure of emotional arousal (Lee and Chamberlain, 2007). As 
such, it does allow an indirect implication of cortical activity at the overall system level 
(Senior, Lee, and Butler, 2011). It’s particular benefit here is the accessibility in terms of 
cost, and ease of use, as well as the lack of invasiveness of the technique. Furthermore, EDA 
can be usefully combined with other neuroimaging methods, such as fMRI. Similarly, 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) can also be usefully combined with other methods, 
to both counter some of their drawbacks, and enhance understanding. TMS allows 
researchers to safely occlude activity in cortical areas. In other words, it allows the researcher 
to stop particular areas of the brain working (Stewart and Walsh, 2006). Doing so can help 
provide positive evidence of the necessity of a given area for a given task. This allows one to 
go beyond the simple observation of brain activity in association with a given task as done 
with fMRI, MEG, and suchlike, towards inferring the causal necessity of a given area of 
brain activity for the completion of the task (i.e., the task cannot occur if that region of the 
brain is not active). The key drawback of TMS is that it can only be used on accessible areas 
of the cortex, rather than deep brain structures (many of which seem relevant to 
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neuromarketing explanations). However, one can possibly use neuropsychological 
participants with either natural or pathological brain lesions in deep areas to explore such 
questions (e.g. Koenigs and Tranel, 2008). That said, ethical questions regarding the use of 
neuropsychological patients for marketing research are of some importance here. 
 
Finally, we will discuss the other techniques noted on Figure 2, which for better or worse 
have little to no application to neuromarketing. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
involves exposing the participant to a radioactive tracer (either by inhalation or injection), 
which can then be used to visualize blood flow to areas of the brain, similar to fMRI. Before 
the advent of fMRI, PET was a key method of functional neuroimaging. However, in recent 
years, its relative disadvantages (cost, lower spatial resolution, invasiveness) have meant that 
for cognitive neuroscience research at least (rather than medical purposes), PET has fallen 
from favour. Nevertheless it does have some advantages over fMRI, not least that it is far less 
sensitive to small movements. Single cell recordings are included not because they are a 
useful neuromarketing technique, but because the exemplify the difference between 
measuring actual brain activity and the various proxies discussed above. Single unit (or 
single cell) recording involves the use of micro-electrodes to directly measure brain activity 
at the level of a single neuron. However, this is exactly as invasive as it sounds. This renders 
its use virtually impossible for neuromarketing or other organizational research purposes 
(Butler, Lee, and Senior 2017). Indeed, it is only in clinical contexts that they can be used in 
humans (although they are commonly used in animals). That said, Cerf et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that neuromarketing-relevant concepts (along with others) can be studied while 
patients are receiving clinical treatment for epilepsy, making single-cell recording at least 
somewhat viable in the right circumstances.  
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Inference in Neuromarketing: What do Brain Scans Actually Tell Us? 
Finally, we address questions regarding what inferences can be drawn from neuroscientific 
data, even if it does accurately reflect actual brain activity. In essence, the issues at hand 
concern a) whether or how we can actually usefully infer anything about psychological 
theories from neuroscientific data, and b) a more fundamental metaphysical concern 
regarding the reality of our subjective experiences of the world. Both issues are of course 
necessarily more philosophical than empirical in nature. While the former has received some 
attention in neuromarketing (e.g. Plassmann et al., 2015), the latter is yet to be examined at 
all, and has in fact rarely been touched on outside philosophy (Bagozzi and Lee, 2017). 
 Beginning with issues of inference, there are two basic ways that inferences can be 
drawn in neuromarketing-type studies. The first is termed forward inference, introduced by 
Henson (2006). In essence, a forward inference approach uses differential patterns of brain 
activity to distinguish between different psychological theories. For example, if there are two 
competing explanations of a given phenomenon, and if “theory 1 predicts that the same 
cognitive processes underlie two different experimental tasks, and theory 2 predicts that the 
tasks differ in terms of at least one cognitive process, then theory 2 will be supported when 
patterns of brain activity differ between the two tasks.” (Heit, 2015, pp. 2). Such an approach 
depends on the assumption that there is at a minimum some kind of meaningful mapping 
from hypothesized psychological processes to actual brain activity, as well as that there is no 
unknown but correct third theory, nor any significant extraneous differences across 
experimental tasks. Such issues appear soluble (notwithstanding the metaphysical issues to be 
discussed later), but a more pressing problem is that not all psychological theories may make 
clear predictions of brain activity, rendering the forward inference concept moot. This may be 
why forward inference approaches appear to be very rare in neuromarketing research, 
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although the same could also be said for cognitive neuroscience in general (Lee, Senior, and 
Butler, 2012).  
 Poldrack (2006) explains the concept of reverse inference in depth, and a number of 
conceptual neuromarketing papers have drawn from this to present their own take on the 
topic (e.g. Breiter et al., 2015; Plassman et al., 2015). Poldrack (2006, pp. 2) characterises 
reverse inference as the “logical fallacy of affirming the consequent”, and thus invalid for 
deductive inference. Poldrack (2006) shows how reverse inference is extremely prevalent in 
cognitive neuroscience using fMRI, and we see the same in neuromarketing. In simple terms, 
a reverse inference is made as follows (as described by Poldrack, 2006, pp. 1):  
1. In the present study, when task comparison A was presented, brain area Z was active. 
2. In other studies, when cognitive process X was putatively engaged, then brain area Z 
was active 
3. Thus, the activity of area Z in the present study demonstrates engagement of cognitive 
process X by task comparison A. 
The fallacy was most famously demonstrated by the 2011 New York Times op-ed by Martin 
Lindstrom entitled ‘You Love Your Iphone, Literally’, which claimed that activity in the 
insular cortex when subjects heard their phones indicated that they loved them. Of course, as 
pointed out by Poldrack (and 44 other neuroscientists) in their letter to the NYT on October 5 
2011, this inference is nonsensical, being that the insular cortex is “active in as many as one 
third of all brain imaging studies…[and]…more often associated with negative than positive 
emotions”. Similar problems can be detected very frequently in both popular and scholarly 
neuromarketing-relevant research. The key problem with reverse inference is that it is rare to 
see a consistent mapping between a given brain area, and a particular psychological process. 
That said, reverse inference is only a true fallacy if it is used in a deductive fashion, and can 
 15 
indeed be useful to develop hypotheses for further study (Poldrack 2011, Hutzler, 2014), 
particularly when utilized in conjunction with large scale machine-learning or meta-analysis. 
 Even if one could justify strong inferences from brain scans to presumed mental 
processes though, the question would still remain, just what does this mean? In other words, 
is there anything more to mental experience than brain activity? What exactly are these 
psychological processes that our theories refer to? Do they have some independent reality 
over and above their physical manifestations (i.e. brain activity etc.), or are terms like 
‘emotion’, ‘attitude’, ‘thought’, or any subjective experience at all, simply metaphors or folk-
terms that have developed to describe what was heretofore mysterious? If so, should we now 
devote all our attention to further study of their physical manifestations, and phase out 
theories which refer to these metaphorical entities or properties, since we now have little 
justification to consider them real? Such questions are rarely explored by neuroscientists 
themselves, who appear to work under the assumption that indeed the mental experience is 
ultimately reducible to physical events (Bagozzi and Lee, 2017), and this view would appear 
to be shared by many in neuromarketing. This is especially evident in the common 
justifications of neuroscientific methods as being able to somehow uncover ‘hidden’ or ‘more 
accurate’ data (e.g. Couwenberg et al., 2016; Rampl et al., 2016). While such an approach 
has its attractions, it does little to provide a convincing explanation of how our subjective 
experiences (e.g. consciousness) are the necessary (as opposed to contingent) consequence of 
our physical brain activity (Nagel, 2012), and thus does not discount the possibility that brain 
states and subjective mental states are actually different things (Kripke, 1980). Such 
questions have significant bearing on how we should approach the future of neuromarketing, 
and indeed social sciences in general (Bagozzi and Lee, 2017), but they are yet to be 
addressed in any depth within the field. 
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Conclusions and Directions for the Coming Decade of Neuromarketing 
10 years on from the publication of the first scholarly articles using the term 
‘neuromarketing’ (at least that we can find), have we really come that far? There are at least 
two ways of answering that question. On the more negative side, it might be argued that for 
the most part, we remain in the same basic position as we did in 2007. That is, a reasonably 
fragmented set of research teams, individually pursuing what could be seen as quite 
piecemeal topics, spread across a wide variety of publication outlets, both within and outside 
marketing itself. Few articles appear to have addressed whether neuroscientific insights can 
help us build new and improved explanations of marketing phenomena, and the majority of 
published studies tend to use neuroscientific methods (most usually fMRI and sometimes 
EEG) to gain what are considered more accurate insights into existing marketing 
explanations. Rarely are competing theories tested (which would hopefully enable a forward 
inference approach), and often researchers fall into the tempting trap of reverse inference, 
assuming that complex psychological processes can be localized to individual brain areas, 
which are necessary and sufficient for their occurrence. Such temptations are most clearly 
seen in that work which receives significant public attention, and marketing is far from alone 
here. But in general, marketing and other social sciences are fertile ground for the growth of 
dangerous over-inferences from brain activity to psychological and social processes. 
 
On a more positive note, it is undeniable that neuroscientific methodologies are now accepted 
as a viable tool to study marketing phenomena. This has to be seen as a positive, as it 
expands the set of tools available to scholars, and also provides reasonably strong evidence 
that neuroscientific methods can provide strong contributions to advancing knowledge. 
Further, the increasing attention given to neuromarketing in the top marketing journals should 
have the effect of inspiring more and more researchers to investigate the potential of 
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neuroscience for their own work. However, for these positive effects to become more 
dominant in future, a number of key issues are in need of greater attention.  
 
The most important issues remain based around understanding, a) the capabilities and 
drawbacks of different neuroscientific methods, b) the benefits of studying biology and the 
brain for understanding marketing phenomena, and c) the conceptual problems which must 
be solved before drawing conclusions from neuroscientific data. Considerable work on 
various aspects of these issues has appeared in management and organizational research (e.g. 
Senior, Lee, and Butler, 2011; Lindebaum, 2016, Healey and Hodgkinson, 2014; Becker, 
Croponzano and Sanfey 2011; Waldman, Balthazard and Peterson, 2011; Butler, Lee, and 
Senior, 2017), but marketing has yet to have a robust discussion around many of these issues. 
Further, few marketing studies have engaged with the relevant management literature on 
these topics, nor the more foundational neuroscience work. Gaps in understanding such as 
this are dangerous, and may lead to poor research with meaningless results, such as how we 
love our IPhones. Work such as this (i.e. Lindstrom, 2011), while not published in scholarly 
journals, is often placed in the same general category as academic work by both the general 
public, and also those who may work in neuroscience itself. This leads to a generally negative 
perception of neuromarketing amongst just those people who we would wish more 
enthusiastic about working with marketing colleagues to investigate important problems. 
Indeed, fruitful collaboration between marketing and neuroscientific scholars is the most 
likely to lead to genuine contributions to our knowledge (e.g. Breiter et al., 2015).  
 
So, in conclusion, our manifesto for a neuromarketing which can in the future make a greater 
contribution to knowledge would probably run along the following lines: 
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1. A robust debate amongst both supporters and detractors of the neuroscientific 
approach to marketing research, hosted by high-impact journals with wide 
readerships. This debate should take in how neuroscience can help understand 
marketing phenomena (or not), the ethics of employing such methods, what 
inferences can be drawn, and suchlike. 
2. Greater attention to diverse modalities of neuroimaging, such as MEG, and TMS, as 
well as much greater attention given to the disadvantages associated with each 
method and the analysis of data. 
3. More research that focuses explicitly on testing competing theories (forward 
inference), and on developing broad explanatory frameworks (e.g. Breiter et al., 
2015). 
4. Following the framework proposed in Bagozzi and Lee (2017), greater attention paid 
to linking various levels of explanation, from physical / objective, to mental / 
subjective. Or at least, further investigations and discussions on the relevance of both 
/ either for our marketing (and social scientific) theories and explanations.  
5. Perhaps most importantly, greater collaboration across marketing and neuroscientific 
researchers to create work with both stronger methodological foundations, and larger 
theoretical contributions. We would also add that collaborations with philosophers 
may be useful, to further develop ideas regarding objective / subjective experience, 
inferences, and suchlike. 
 
While the above may seem a daunting list, it is not particularly far from how the fields of 
management and organizational research have addressed the very same issues. We have 
every confidence that marketing scholarship is willing to engage in a similar way, with the 
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same goal – that of increasing the value of what we do, and further advancing knowledge into 
important marketing phenomena. 
  
 20 
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